This paper addresses whether transaction ‡ows in foreign exchange markets convey information about fundamentals. We begin with a GE model in the spirit of Hayek (1945) in which fundamental information is …rst manifest in the economy at the micro level, i.e., in a way that is not symmetrically observed by all agents. With this information structure, induced foreign exchange transactions play a central role in the aggregation process, providing testable links between transaction ‡ows, exchange rates, and future fundamentals. We test these links using data on all end-user currency trades received by Citibank over 6.5 years, a sample su¢ ciently long to analyze real-time forecasts at the quarterly horizon. The predictions are borne out in four empirical …ndings that de…ne this paper's main contribution: (1) transaction ‡ows forecast future macro variables such as output growth, money growth, and in ‡ation, (2) transaction ‡ows forecast these macro variables signi…cantly better than spot rates do, (3) transaction ‡ows (proprietary) forecast future spot rates, and (4) though proprietary ‡ows convey new information about future fundamentals, much of this information is still not impounded in the spot rate one quarter later. These results indicate that the signi…cance of transaction ‡ows for exchange rates extends well beyond high frequencies.
Introduction
Exchange rate movements at frequencies of one year or less remain unexplained by observable macroeconomic variables (Meese and Rogo¤ 1983 , Frankel and Rose 1995 , Cheung et al. 2002 . In their survey, Frankel and Rose (1995) describe evidence to date as indicating that "no model based on such standard fundamentals ... will ever succeed in explaining or predicting a high percentage of the variation in the exchange rate, at least at short-or medium-term frequencies." Seven years later, Cheung et al.'s (2002) comprehensive study concludes that "no model consistently outperforms a random walk."
This paper addresses this long-standing puzzle from a new direction. Rather than attempting to empirically link exchange rates directly to macro variables, we address instead the microeconomic mechanism by which information concerning macro variances is impounded in exchange rates by the market. One way to frame our approach is via the present value relation, in which the log spot exchange rate s t is expressed as the sum of two terms; the present value of measured fundamentals f m t ; and the present value of unmeasured fundamentals f u t :
where 0 < b < 1 is a discount factor, and E t is the conditional expectations operator using market information in period t: Empirical analysis of equation (1) is hampered by two factors. First, researchers only have data on a subset of the macro variables that could conceivably drive exchange rates, measured fundamentals f m t : Second, some of the information used in forming market expectations, E t f m t+i and E t f u t+i ; is typically unavailable. Consequently, empirical analysis of the link between spot rates and macro variables must be based on
where b E t f m t+i denotes the econometric estimates of market forecasts, and t represents the "unexplained" portion of the spot rate:
The poor performance of empirical models linking exchange rates to macro variables implies that movements in t dominate changes in the estimated present value of measured fundamentals (i.e. the …rst term on the right in equation 2). Equation (3) shows that these movements could originate from variations in the present value of unobserved fundamentals. This is the motivation behind research that looks to expand the set of variables that act as fundamentals. As yet, this e¤ort has not resulted in much empirical success. An alternative approach is suggested by the second term in (3). Di¤erences between the market's forecasts of measured fundamentals and econometric estimates of these forecasts could also account for the large movements in t : It is this possibility that motivates the analysis in this paper. Our approach focuses on the gap between the information sets of the econometrician and the market. Speci…cally, we address whether microeconomic information that is available to the market, but not available to the econometrician, is helpful in forming estimates of market expectations, E t f m t+i . We recognize that a positive …nding is not itself a resolution of the Meese-Rogo¤ determination puzzle. It is instead an investigation of what may be a missing link in that puzzle. This analysis complements the recent results of Engel and West (2004) . They …nd that spot rates have forecasting power for future measured fundamentals as the equation (1) predicts. Our purpose is to suggest another channel through which the theory behind (1) might …nd support. More speci…cally, we investigate whether transaction ‡ows convey information useful in forecasting future fundamentals to the market-makers who quote foreign exchange prices. We shall argue that any information conveyed by transaction ‡ows is incremental to the information contained in the observed history of macro variables used in econometric estimates of E t f m t+i : Consequently, if transactions ‡ows do indeed convey information about fundamentals to market-makers, these ‡ows will provide a measure of the variations in (E t b E t )f m t+i : Our empirical analysis is related to earlier research by Froot and Ramadorai (2002) , hereafter F&R. These authors examine the statistical relationships between real exchange rates, excess currency returns, real interest di¤erentials, and the transaction ‡ows of institutional investors. The empirical analysis we present di¤ers from F&R in three important respects. First, we make no assumption about the long run behavior of the real exchange rate. By contrast, the variance decompositions F&R use are based on long run purchasing power parity. Second, we analyze transaction ‡ows from di¤erent user segments that span demand for foreign currency, not just institutional investors. Our results indicate that the transaction ‡ows from di¤erent segments convey di¤erent information, so including ‡ows from all segments is empirically important for understanding the links between ‡ows, exchange rates and fundamentals. Third, our analysis incorporates real-time estimates of the fundamental macro variables. These estimates correspond to the macro data that was available to market participants at the time rather than the values that only became available months later. The use of these real-time estimates allows use to examine the relationship between ‡ows and fundamentals with much greater precision than would be otherwise possible. The information conveyed by transaction ‡ows is not concentrated "insider" information, but rather information that is dispersed around the economy and aggregated by the market (Hayek 1945) . In textbook models, such information does not exist: relevant information is either symmetric economy-wide, or, sometimes, asymmetrically assigned to a single agent-the central bank. And, as a result, no textbook model predicts that market-wide transaction ‡ows should drive exchange rates. In this paper we develop a two country general equilibrium model in which information is dispersed. This model produces a present value representation for the equilibrium exchange rate like equation (1), from a framework that incorporates optimizing households that make consumption and portfolio decisions, a realistic set of asset markets, and …nancial intermediaries who quote security prices and …ll household orders for …nancial assets. The presence of …nancial intermediaries distinguishes this model from other general equilibrium models and allows us to study how dispersed information becomes embedded in exchange rates in detail. This analysis builds on Evans and Lyons (2004) , but here we focus on the empirical implications. In particular, we show that the presence of dispersed information about fundamentals leads to a concurrent correlation between changes in spot rates and transaction ‡ows that match the data. More strikingly, the model predicts that order ‡ow should have superior forecasting power for future fundamentals than current spot rates. Related to this result, the model clari…es why dispersed information about fundamentals becomes impounded in spot rates only slowly.
The second half of the paper contains our empirical results. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we …nd that:
1. transaction ‡ows forecast future exchange rates changes, and do so more e¤ectively than forward discounts, 2. transaction ‡ows forecast subsequent macroeconomic variables such as money growth, output growth, and in ‡ation, and 3. in cases where transaction ‡ows convey signi…cant new information about future fundamentals, much of this information is still not impounded in the exchange rate itself three months later.
While these results represent a qualitative departures from the results of earlier exchange rate research using micro data, we think they hold much more signi…cance from a macro perspective. For example, they direct attention away from understanding the t term in (2) as "missing fundamental variables" like the FX risk premium, and away from bubbles and behavioral explanations (without, of course, ruling these possibilities out). The results also indicate that information aggregation takes place on a macroeconomic time-scale, rather than on the ultra-high frequency time scale that one might imagine applies to the frenzied world of trading. Rather, the picture that emerges is nuanced, emphasizing ‡ows of dispersed information, but within a framework for how exchange rates are determined that extends existing macro models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 derives the main implications of the model's equilibrium that are the focus of the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
In this section we describe the structure of the model. There are two countries, each populated by a large number of households. For concreteness we shall refer to the home and foreign countries as the US and Europe. The Dollar ($) and Euro (e) will therefore denote the home and foreign currencies. Our primary focus will be on the behavior of the spot nominal exchange rate, S t ; which we de…ne as the home price of foreign currency, or speci…cally, the Dollar price of Euros ($/e). We will also refer to the real exchange rate:
where P t and P t are respectively the consumer price indices in Europe and the US. With these de…nitions, a depreciation in the value of the Dollar corresponds to a rise in S t : A depreciation in the real value of the Dollar corresponds to a rise in Q t and represents an increase in the price of European consumer goods relative to US goods.
Below, we …rst describe the preferences and constraints facing US and European households. Next, we discuss how …rms set the prices of consumer goods. Finally, we describe how …nancial intermediaries act as market-makers in world …nancial markets. Readers more interested in our empirical results, could proceed to Section ?? where we present the theoretical implications of the model that are the focus of our empirical analysis.
Households
Each country is populated by a continuum of households arranged on the unit interval [0, 1] . We assume that half the households live in each country, and use the index z 2 [0; 1=2) to denote households in the home country, the US, and z 2 [1=2; 1] to denote households in the foreign country, Europe. All households derive utility from consumption and real balances.
Preferences for US households are given by:
where 0 < < 1 is the discount factor, and 1. E h t denotes expectations conditioned on US household information, z;t for z 2 [0; 1=2): M z;t is the stock of Dollars held by household z; and C z;t is a CES consumption index de…ned by:
where C j z;t ; j = f1; 2g is the consumption of good j by household z in period t: The corresponding US price index is
where P j t is the Dollar price of good j: Households can hold a variety of …nancial assets. In particular we assume that US households can hold one-period bonds denominated in Dollars, B z;t ; or Euros B z;t . US households can also hold a portfolio of (nominally) risky assets, with dollar value A z;t ; that may comprise domestic stocks, foreign stocks and derivatives such as forward contracts and options. We will not keep track of the individual asset holdings within A z;t ; but will denote the dollar return on the risky portfolio between t and t + 1 as exp (r t+1 ) : With these assumptions, the US household's budget constraint is
At the beginning of each period, US households observe the return on their assets, r t , and the prices of consumer goods P 1 t and P 2 t set by …rms. They also see the spot exchange rate, S t ; and the prices of US and European one-period bonds, P b t and P b* t ; quoted by …nancial intermediaries. With this information, US households make their period t consumption and portfolio allocation choices. In particular, US households choose consumption C j z;t ; and the portfolio shares b* z;t S t P b* t B z;t =P t W z;t ; a z;t A z;t =P t W z;t and m z;t M z;t =P t W z;t where W z;t is the value of wealth at the beginning of period t; to maximize (4) subject to (7).
The …rst order conditions associated with this optimization problem are:
Here i t and i t are the US and European nominal interest rates implied by the prices of one-period bonds:
The derivation of these …rst order conditions and the other mathematical details of the model can be found in the Appendix.
The preferences and constraints facing European households are de…ned in an analogous manner. In particular, Europeans choose consumption and portfolios to maximize
subject to
for z 2 [1=2; 1] where r t is the nominal return (in Euros) on the foreign asset portfolio, with nominal value A z ;t at the start of period t. P t is the European price index:
where P j t is the Euro price of good j: The …rst order conditions characterizing the consumption and portfolio decisions of European households are analogous to those in (8).
Firms
There are two …rms, one producing each good. Each …rm has monopoly power in the US and European market for its good. We assume that …rms set prices in each market optimally given local demand for the good, the costs of production, and the costs of changing prices. Since our theoretical results are not dependent on the exact form of this price-setting problem, we do not model it in any detail. We simply note that our model can accommodate Calvo-style price-setting (Calvo, 1983) so that consumer prices are sticky, or the presence of non-traded inputs into the distribution of consumer goods as in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2003) . The only feature we shall emphasize is that segmentation in the markets for consumer goods is su¢ cient for deviations from the law of one price to exist for consumer goods.
To see how the price-setting decisions of …rms determine the real exchange rate, let Q j t
denote the relative price in dollars at which …rm j sells goods in Europe relative to the US. Using this de…nition to substitute for P j t in the European price index gives
Taking logs and a …rst-order approximation to the term on the right hand side around the point where 
where ' = 1=(1 + 1 ) > 0: Equation (11) provides an approximation to the log real exchange rate in terms of the relative prices …rms set for the goods they sell in European and US markets. If consumer goods could be freely and instantaneously moved between countries, goods arbitrage would ensure that Q j t = 1. Under these conditions, …rms could in e¤ect only set prices in one market, and purchasing power parity would prevail. By contrast, we assume that the presence of transactions and/or other costs segments consumer goods markets so that Q j t may di¤er from one. Deviations from the law of one price induced by the price-setting decisions of …rms are the source of real exchange rate variations in the model. This is consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Engel (1999) and others.
Financial Intermediaries
There are D dealers, indexed by d; that act as intermediaries in four …nancial markets: the home money and bond markers, and the foreign money and bond markets. As such, each dealer quotes prices at which they stand ready to buy or sell securities to households and other dealers. Dealers also have the opportunity to initiate transactions with other dealers at the prices they quote. Thus, unlike standard international macro models, the behavior of the exchange and interest rates are determined by the securities prices dealers choose to quote as the solution of a utility maximization problem. We therefore begin by considering the preferences and constraints that characterize of the optimization problem facing dealers.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all dealers are located in the US. The preferences of dealer d are given by:
where E d t denotes expectations conditioned on the dealer's period t information, d;t , and C d;t represents dealer d's consumption of goods 1 and 2 aggregated via the CES function shown in (5). Note that dealer preferences only di¤er from those of households in that real balances have no utility value. As a consequence, dealers will not hold currency in equilibrium (as an asset class, currencies are dominated by bonds) and act solely as intermediaries between households and central banks in the money markets. The importance of this feature will become apparent when we derive the equations that determine exchange rates below.
At the beginning of period t, each dealer d quotes a priceS d;t at which he is willing to buy or sell foreign currency. He also quotes prices at which he is willing to buy or sell one period pure discount bonds -P The quote and trading decisions of dealers must respect two constraints: the ‡ow constraints implied by market clearing and the dynamic budget constraint describing the evolution of their asset holdings. The ‡ow constraint for trades initiated by households and other dealers is given by:
where O v t denotes an incoming order to purchase asset v from a household, and T v t is an incoming order to purchase asset v from a dealer. For trades initiated by dealer d; the ‡ow constraint is:
Notice that the prices for bonds and foreign currency in this equation (i.e., P b t ; P b* t and S t ) are the prices the dealer is quoted by others in the market. The dynamic budget constraint of dealer d is given by: 
where
t is the information set common of all dealers at the beginning of period t: The functions F s (:); F b (:) and F b* (:) (described below) map elements of this information set into a common quote for foreign currency, home bonds and foreign bonds. Equation (17) shows that optimal quotes have three features. First, the prices quoted to households by each dealer are the same as those quoted to other dealers. Second, quotes are common across all dealers. Third, all quotes are functions of common information.
To see why optimal quotes must have these features, consider how the choice of spot rate quote a¤ects (16). Suppose dealer d quotes a price S d;t > S t prior to the start of interdealer trading. Because all quotes are observable and are good for any amount, incoming orders for foreign currency will be negative (T m t < 0) as dealers attempt to make arbitrage pro…ts. Under these circumstances, (S d;t S t ) T m t has limiting value of 1: Similarly, if S d;t < S t ; arbitrage trading will generate an incoming ‡ow of foreign currency orders (i.e., T
will again have a limiting value of 1: As the terms in the second row of (16) show, the only way to avoid similar arbitrage losses via bond trading is for P
Thus, optimal interdealer quotes must be common across dealers to avoid the (expected utility) losses associated with arbitrage. This requires that quotes be a function of information that is known to all dealers, d t : A similar arbitrage argument applies to the prices dealers quote to households {S d;t ;P b d;t ;P b* d;t g. Again, these quotes are publicly observed and households are free to place orders with several dealers. Consequently, all dealers must quote the same prices to avoid arbitrage trading losses. In this environment, competition between dealers will ensure that households receive the same quotes as dealers.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is described by: (i) a set of dealer quotes for the prices of bonds and foreign currency, and consumer prices set by …rms that clear markets, given the consumption and portfolio choices of households and dealers; and (ii) a set of consumption and portfolio rules that maximize expected utility of households and dealers, given the prices of bonds, foreign currency and consumer goods. In this section we examine speci…c aspects of this equilibrium that will guide the empirical analysis that follows. In particular, our focus will be on how information concerning the state of the macro economy is transmitted to dealers via 2 To illustrate a form this competition could take, suppose the common currency quote o¤ered to households,St; is less than the quote o¤ered to dealers, St. In this situation dealer d could o¤er households a contract that paid (St S t) per Euro ordered with 0 < < 1 if St S t > 0 and zero otherwise. This option contract would create trading gains for dealer d at the expense of other dealers because households would have a strong incentive to place positive Euro orders with him and negative orders elsewhere. The only way for dealers to insulate themselves against this form of competition is to quoteSt = St: trade in …nancial markets. Because dealers set the prices of bonds and foreign currency, this transmission process is central to understanding the dynamics of interest rates and exchange rates.
While our model can accommodate di¤erences in the information available to individual households and dealers, we shall keep things simple by assuming that all agents within a given group (US households, European households and dealers,) have the same information. We denote these three information sets as h t , h* t , and d t , respectively. With this simpli…cation, we can use a representative agent within each of these three groups to describe their behavior.
Exchange and Interest Rates
In Section (1.3) we argued that utility maximizing dealers will quote common prices for currency and bonds based on information they all possess before trading starts each period. We now turn to the question of how these quotes are related to dealer's information d t : This will pin down the equilibrium dynamics of the spot exchange rate together with home and foreign interest rates.
The mapping from dealer's information d t to quotes is identi…ed in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium where; (i) dealers choose not to take open foreign exchange positions, and (ii) the risk-adjusted return on dealer's other assets equals zero, the log price for foreign currency quoted by all dealers is
where exchange rate fundamentals, f t ; are de…ned as
Dealers also quote common prices for US and European bonds that satisfy:
where m t ; m t ; c t and c t represent the log aggregate of Dollars, Euros, US consumption and European consumption respectively (i.e., m t = ln R z m z;t dz). i and are positive constants.
The Appendix provides a detailed derivation of these equations and the results reported in the propositions that follow. Here, we provide some intuition. First, consider the bond price quotes in (20). Because households are the sole holders of their national currencies, dealers quote prices that equate the aggregate demand for currency from households with the expected stock of currency. Notice that (20) constitute standard money market equilibrium conditions except for the presence of the terms involving dealer expectations, E d t . Dealers quote bond prices without precise knowledge of household consumption plans, so the actual currency orders they receive may di¤er from what was expected. Recall that dealers can o¤set the e¤ects of any unexpected currency orders by trading with central banks, so they never …nd themselves with unwanted currency balances at the end of trading in each period.
Equation (18) plays a central role in our analysis. It shows that the log price of foreign currency quoted by all dealers is equal to the present value of fundamentals, f t : There are two noteworthy di¤erences between this speci…cation and the exchange rate equations found in traditional monetary models. First, the de…nition of fundamentals in (19) includes the di¤erence between foreign and home consumption rather than income. This arises because household preferences imply that the demand for national currencies depends on consumption rather than income. Second, equation (18) shows that fundamentals a¤ect the spot rate only via dealers' expectations. This is a particularly important feature of the model: Since the current spot rate is simply the common price of foreign currency quoted by dealers before trading starts, it must only be a function of information that is common to all dealers at the time, t . This means that all exchange rate dynamics in our model are driven by the evolution of dealers'common information.
What are the roles of conditions (i) and (ii)? Condition (i) restricts attention to an equilibrium where there is no incentive for dealers to manipulate the market. In an equilibrium where dealers wanted to keep a long position in foreign currency, for example, there would be a strong incentive to quote currency prices that were "too low", so spot rates would not solely re ‡ect dealers expectations regarding current and future fundamentals. Condition (i) not only rules out this possibility, but also ensures that our equilibrium is consistent with the evidence in Lyons (1995) and Bjonnes and Rime (2004) showing the low incidence of open currency positions among actual dealers. Condition (ii) plays a similar role -it simply eliminates a risk premium term from the de…nition of fundamentals. Relaxing this condition would not materially a¤ect our analysis.
Transaction Flows
We now consider the implications of Proposition 1 for transaction ‡ows. In particular, our aim is to identify the components that contribute to household order ‡ow in the international currency and bond markets. Let x t denote aggregate household order ‡ow de…ned as the dollar value of aggregate household purchases of European bonds during period t trading. The contribution of US households to this order ‡ow is S t B z;t B z;t 1 = b* z;t P t W z;t exp (i t ) S t B z;t 1 where b* z;t denotes the desired share of European bonds in the US households' wealth. Similarly, European households contribute S t B z ;t B z ;t 1 = b* z ;t S t P t W z ;t exp (i t ) S t B z ;t 1 : Market clearing requires that aggregate holdings of European foreign bonds by dealers and households sum to zero, so that B d;t 1 + B z ;t 1 + B z;t 1 = 0: Hence, aggregate order ‡ow can be written as
where W t W t +S t P t W t and t W t =W t : Thus, order ‡ow depends upon the portfolio allocation decisions of US and European households (via b* z;t ; and b* z ;t ), the level and international distribution of household wealth (via W t and t ) and the outstanding stock of foreign bonds held by dealers from last period's trading, B d;t 1 : These elements imply that order ‡ow contains both pre-determined (backward-looking) and non-predetermined (forward-looking) components. The former are given by the level and distribution of wealth, the latter by the portfolio shares because they depend on households'forecasts of future returns. We formalize these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The utility-maximizing choice of portfolios by US and European households implies that aggregate order ‡ow may be approximated by
with ; > 0; where rE similar structure. Here our focus is on the empirical implications of the model, so we present the equilibrium dynamics in reduced form:
where y t y t y t 1 with u t+1 a vector of mean zero shocks. This speci…cation for the equilibrium dynamics of the state variables is completely general, yet it allows us to examine the link between order ‡ow and fundamentals in a straightforward way.
We start with the behavior of spot rates. Let fundamentals be a linear combination of the elements in the state vector: f t = Cy t : When dealers quote spot rates according to (18) in Proposition 1, and (23) describes the dynamics of the state vector y t ; the spot rate can be written as
1 A{ 2 , with y t = { 1 y t and y t = { 2 y t : is a vector that relates the log spot rate to dealers'current estimate of the state vector y t : We can now write the US forecast di¤erential as:
Suppose that US households collectively know as much about the state of the economy as dealers do. Under these circumstances, the right hand side of (25) is equal to E The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. If US households are collectively as well-informed about the future state of the economy as dealers, then rE
; so the forecast di¤erential depends on the speed at which US household expect dealers to assimilate new information concerning the future state of the economy. We term this the pace of information aggregation. If dealers learn nothing new about y t+1 from period t trading, E d t+1 y t+1 = E d t y t+1 : Hence, if US households expect that period t trading will reveal nothing new to dealers,
and there is no di¤erence between dealer and household forecasts of future spot rates. Under these circumstances, there is no information aggregation so and are equal to null matrices. Alternatively, if households expect dealers to assimilate information from period t trading, the forecast di¤erentials for spot rates will be non-zero. In the extreme case where period-t trading is su¢ ciently informative to reveal to dealers all that households know about the future state of the economy,
In this case, the pace of information is fast so and equal the identity matrices. Under other circumstances where the pace of information aggregation is slower, the and matrices will have many non-zero elements. (Exact expressions for and are provided in the Appendix.) Equation (27) combines (22) from Proposition 2 with (26). This equation expresses order ‡ow in terms of forecast di¤erentials for the future state of the economy and the speed of information aggregation. Since fundamentals represent a combination of the elements in y t ; (27) also serves to link dispersed information regarding future fundamentals to order ‡ow. In particular, if households have more information about the future course of fundamentals than dealers, and dealers are expected to assimilate at least some of this information from transactions ‡ows each period, order ‡ow will be correlated with variations in the forecast di¤erentials for fundamentals.
It is important to realize that the household orders driving order ‡ow in this model are driven solely by the desire to optimally adjust portfolios. Households have no desire to inform dealers about the future state of the economy, so the information conveyed to dealers via transaction ‡ows occur as a by-product of their dynamic portfolio allocation decisions. The transactions ‡ows associated with these decisions establish the link between order ‡ow, dispersed information, and the speed of information shown in equation (27) .
One aspect of our model deserves further clari…cation. Our model abstracts from informational heterogeneity at the household level, so h t and h* t represent the information sets of the representative US and European households. This means that the results in Proposition 3 are derived under the assumption that representative households have strictly more information than dealers (
Clearly this is a strong assumption. Taken literally, it implies that every household knows more about the current and future state of the economy than any given dealer. Fortunately, our central results do not rely on this literal interpretation. To see why, suppose, for example, that each household receives a money demand shock and is thereby privately motived to trade foreign exchange. In this setting, no household would consider itself to have superior information. But the aggregate of those realized household trades would in fact convey information about the average household shock, i.e., the state of the macroeconomy. For the sake of parsimony, we have not modelled heterogeneity at the home and foreign household levels. Instead, we assume that households in any given country share the same information about the macroeconomy. Extending the model to capture heterogeneity is a natural extension, but not one that would alter the main implications of our model that are the focus of the empirical analysis below.
Data
Our empirical analysis utilizes a new data set that comprises end-user transaction ‡ows, spot rates and macro fundamentals over six and a half years. The transaction ‡ow data is of a fundamentally di¤erent type and it covers a much longer time period than the data used in earlier work (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002a,b) The di¤erence in type is our shift from inter-marketmaker order ‡ow to end-user order ‡ow. By end users we are referring to three main segments: non-…nancial corporations, investors (such as mutual funds and pension funds), and leveraged traders (such as hedge funds and proprietary traders). Though inter-marketmaker transactions account for about two-thirds of total volume in major currency markets, they are largely derivative of the underlying shifts in end-user demands. Our data on the three end-user segments include all of Citibank's end-user trades in the largest spot market, the USD/EUR market, over a sample from January 1993 to June 1999.
3 Citibank's end-user market share in these currencies is in the 10-15 percent range; no other bank has a larger market share in these currencies.
There are many advantages of our end-user data. First, the data are simply more powerful, covering much longer time spans. Second, because these trades re ‡ect the world economy's primitive currency demands, the data provide a bridge to modern macro analysis. Third, the three segments span the full set of underlying demand types; those not covered by extant end-user data sets are empirically quite important for exchange rate determination, as we show below.
4 Fourth, because the data are disaggregated into segments, we can address whether the behavior of these di¤erent ‡ow measures is similar, and whether the information conveyed by each, dollar for dollar, is similar. Our empirical analysis also utilizes new high-frequency real-time estimates of macro fundamentals for the US and Germany: speci…cally GDP growth, CPI in ‡ation, and M1 money growth. By "real time", we mean estimates that correspond to actual macroeconomic data available at any given time. It is, of course, these actual information sets, and the expectations that derive from them, that pin down asset pricing, not the sequence of revised values that become available many months later that make up standard macro time-series.
5
A simple example clari…es the di¤erence between a real time estimate of a macro variable and the data series usually employed in empirical analysis. Consider a variable Z that summarizes economy-wide information during month ; that ends on day m( ), with value Z m( ) . Data on the value of Z is released on day r( ) after the end of month with a reporting lag of r( ) m( ) days. Reporting lags vary from month to month because data is collected on a calendar basis, but releases issued by statistical agencies are not made on holidays and weekends. For quarterly series, such as GDP, reporting lags can be as long as several months.
Real-time estimates of Z m( ) are constructed using the information in a speci…c information set. Let i denote an information set that only contains data known at the start of day i: The real-time estimate of
The real-time estimates have two important attributes. First, if the variables in i are a subset of the variables known to market participants on day i; the real-time estimate of Z m( ) can be legitimately used as a variable a¤ecting market actively on day i: Standard times series values for macro variables do not have this feature. In particular, because the value of Z m( ) is released with a reporting lag, this value cannot be used to construct a measure of fundamentals that was known to all market participants during month : The second attribute of the real-time estimates concerns the frequency with which macro data is collected and released. Many series are collected on a monthly basis and released with a reporting lag of generally no more than one month. Other series, notably GDP growth, are constructed on a quarterly basis and the reporting lag runs to several months. The use of real-time estimates allows us to relate the behavior of exchange rates and order ‡ow to macro variables on a weekly or even daily frequency. The real-time estimates used here are conceptually distinct from the real-time data series studied by Croushore and Stark (2001) , Orphanides (2001) and others. A real-time data series comprises a set of historical values for a variable that are known on a particular date. This date identi…es the vintage of the real-time data. For example, the value for Z m( ) released on day r( ); Z m( )jr( ) ; represents the …rst vintage of real-time data for Z from month : The conceptual distinction between real-time data and estimates can be further examined with the identity
This expression decomposes the di¤erence between the real-time data value and estimate for Z m( ) into two components. The …rst is the di¤erence between the real time estimate of Z m( ) at the end of month and the estimate on a day earlier in the month. The importance of this component should generally decline as i nears the end of the month. The second component is the di¤erence between the value for Z m( ) released on day r( ) and the real-time estimate of Z m( ) at the end of the month. This term identi…es the impact of information concerning Z m( ) collected by the statistical agency before the release date that was not part of the m( ) information set. The importance of this component depends on how much is learnt in retrospect over the reporting lag about the behavior of Z m( ) by the statistical agency, and how much more information the agency has concerning Z m( ) at the end of the month relative to m( ) :
In this paper we construct real time estimates of GDP growth, consumer price in ‡ation, and M1 growth for the US and Germany using an information set i spanned by 35 macro series. These series come from a database maintained by Money Market News Services that contains details of each data release. For the US estimates we use the 3 US quarterly GDP releases and the monthly releases on 18 other US macro variables. The German real-time estimates are computed using the monthly releases on 14 German macro variables. It is important to note that these speci…cations for i only include macro data from regular releases made by US and German statistical agencies. As such, our real time estimates are computed using a speci…cation for i that represents a strict subset of the information available to …nancial market participants at the time. A detailed description of the quasi-maximum likelihood procedure used to compute the real-time estimates can be found in Evans (2005) . Figure 1 provides some visual evidence on the di¤erence between the real-time estimates of GDP and the series of GDP data releases for the US. The graph displays two noteworthy features. First, the real-time estimates (shown by the solid plot) display a much greater degree of volatility than the cumulant of the data releases (shown by the dashed plot). This volatility re ‡ects how inferences about current GDP change as information arrives in the form of monthly data releases during the current quarter and GDP releases referring to growth in the previous quarter. The second noteworthy feature concerns the vertical gap between the plots. This represents the di¤erence between the real-time estimates and the ex post value of log GDP based on data releases. This gap should be insigni…cant if the current level of GDP could be precisely inferred from contemporaneously available data releases. Figure 1 shows this to be the case during the third and forth quarters of 1995. During many other periods, the real-time estimates were much less precise.
In the analysis that follows, we shall consider the joint behavior of exchange rates, order ‡ows and the real-time estimates of macro variables at the weekly, monthly and quarterly frequency. Over the 6 year span of our data, the weekly analysis provides a much greater degree of precision in our statistical inferences concerning the high frequency link between ‡ows, exchange rates and macro variables than would be otherwise possible.
Empirical Analysis
In this section we examine the empirical implications of Propositions 1 -3. First, we consider the implications of our model for the correlation between order ‡ows and changes in spot exchange rates. Next, we examine the links between spot rates and fundamentals. We then focus on the forecasting power of order ‡ows for fundamentals. Our model identi…es conditions under which order ‡ow should have incremental forecasting power beyond spot rates, and we …nd strong empirical support for this prediction in the data. Finally, we consider the pace of information aggregation. Evans and Lyons (2002a,b) show that order ‡ows account for between 40 and 80 percent of the daily variation in the spot exchange rates of major currency pairs. We now provide a structural interpretation of this …nding using the results in Propositions 1 -3.
The Order Flow/Spot Rate Correlation
Recall that when dealers'foreign currency quotes satisfy (18) and (19) in Proposition 1, the log spot rate satis…es E d t s t+1 +i t i t = 0: Combining this restriction with the identity
where the second line follows from the relation between the spot rate and state vector described by equation (24). Thus, Proposition 1 implies that the rate of depreciation is equal to the interest di¤erential plus the revision in dealer forecasts concerning the future state of the economy between periods t and t + 1: This forecast revision is attributable to two possible information sources. The …rst is public information that arrives right at the start of period t + 1, before dealers quote s t+1 . The second is information conveyed by the transactions ‡ows during period t: It is this second information source that accounts for the correlation between order ‡ow and spot rate changes in the data as Proposition 4 shows.
Proposition 4 When dealer quotes for the price of foreign currency satisfy (18), and order ‡ow follows (27), the rate of depreciation can be written as
t+1 represents the portion of E d t+1 y t+1 E d t y t+1 that is uncorrelated with order ‡ow, and b is a projection coe¢ cient equal to
where V (:) and CV(:; :) denote the population variance and covariance:
Inspection of expression (30) reveals that the observed correlation between order ‡ow and the rate of depreciation can arise through two channels. First, if the distribution of wealth and dealer bond holdings a¤ect both order ‡ow (via o t in equation 22) and has forecasting power for fundamentals, order ‡ow will be correlated with the depreciation rate through the …rst term in (30). Since there is little variation in o t from month to month or even quarter to quarter, it is unlikely that this channel accounts for much of the order ‡ow/spot rate correlation we observed at a daily or weekly frequency. The second channel operates through the transmission of dispersed information. If household expectations for the future state vector di¤er from dealers' expectations, and information aggregation accompanies trading in period t; both the second and third terms in (30) will be positive. Notice that the depreciation rate is correlated with order ‡ow in this case not just because households and dealers hold di¤erent expectations, but also because households expect some of their information to be assimilated by dealers from the transactions ‡ows they observe in period t: In this sense, the correlation between order ‡ow and the depreciation rate informs us about both the existence of dispersed information and the pace at with information aggregation takes place. Now we turn to the empirical evidence. Table 1 presents the results of regressing excess currency returns, s t+1 + i t i t ; on order ‡ows from di¤erent end-users. We present results for returns measured over one day, one week and one month, with order ‡ow cumulated over the same horizon. Two points emerge from the table. First, the coe¢ cient estimates are quite di¤erent according to the origin of the order ‡ow. This …nding is consistent with the idea, formalized by Proposition 4, that the correlation between the depreciation rate and order ‡ow depends (in part) on the information di¤erential driving transactions. While it seems reasonable that the trades initiated by di¤erent sets of end-user are associated with di¤erent information di¤erentials, our model is not rich enough to exactly account to the pattern of coe¢ cient estimates we observe. The second noteworthy point concerns explanatory power. Notice that the R 2 statistics increase with the horizon. The explanatory power of ‡ows for concurrent returns is substantial: at the monthly frequency, the R 2 statistic when all ‡ow segments are included is 30 percent. 6 We also …nd that end-user ‡ows convey information beyond that in the inter-marketmaker ‡ows used in Evans and Lyons (2002a,b) . When both types of ‡ow are included in a regression of daily excess returns, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on end-user ‡ows are zero at the 1 percent level.
The results in Table 1 provide preliminary evidence that is consistent with the theoretical links between exchange rates, order ‡ow and fundamentals implied by our model. We now turn to a more detailed inspection of the link between spot rates and fundamentals.
Spot Rates and Fundamentals
We shall examine the link between spot rates and fundamentals in two ways. First we examine the model's implications for forecasting fundamentals with spot rates. Second, we study whether our model can account for the apparent lack of cointegration between the spot rates and fundamentals (see, for example, Engel and West 2004) . The model's implications for forecasting fundamentals with spot rates follow straightforwardly from Proposition 1. In particular equation (18) can be rewritten as
Thus, the log spot rate quoted by dealers di¤ers from dealers' current estimate of fundamentals by the present value of future changes in fundamentals. One implication of (31) is that the gap between the current spot rate and estimated fundamentals, s t E d t f t ; should have forecasting power for future changes in fundamentals. This can be formally shown by χ statistics for the null that all the coefficients on order flow are zero. Estimates are calculated at the daily frequency. The standard errors correct for heteroskedastic and the moving average error process induced by overlapping forecasts (1 week and 1 month results).
considering the projection:
and " t+ is the projection error that is uncorrelated with s t E d t f t . The projection coe¢ cient s provides a measure of the forecasting power of s t E d t f t for the change in fundamentals h periods ahead. Now suppose that we attempt to forecast the same change in fundamentals with s t f t : In this case the projection is
When dealers have incomplete information about the current level of fundamentals, V (f t E d t f t ) > 0; and s will be pushed below s : This is a form of attenuation bias that arises because the use of f t rather than E d t f t in the forecasting equation introduces an errors-in-variables problem. Of course mis-measurement is not in itself a new idea -many papers have recognized that an incomplete de…nition of fundamentals may be contributing to the poor forecasting performance of spot rates. Here, however, the errors-in-variables problem occurs not because realized fundamentals are mis-measured, but because spot rates are determined by dealers'real-time estimates of fundamentals that may di¤er signi…cantly from f t :
A similar errors-in-variables problem plagues tests for the presence of cointegration between the spot rate and fundamentals. To see why, we rewrite equation (31) as:
According to this equation, s t and f t should be cointegrated when: (i) f t follows a non-stationary I(1) process, and (ii) the dealers'error in estimating the current level of f t is stationary I(0): When dealers observe money stocks and consumer prices, f t E d t f t will be a function of their errors in estimating household consumption. Uncertainty about household consumption decisions may therefore contribute to the dynamics of s t f t : A simple example provides useful intuition on the potential size of this contribution.
Suppose that fundamentals follow a random walk, f t+1 = v t+1 where v t+1 is an i.i.d. mean zero shock that is uncorrelated with f t and elements of d Notice that the autoregressive coe¢ cient in this process approaches unity as the variance of the noise rises. Thus, dealers'estimation errors will be more persistent when the information they receive about the current level of fundamentals is less precise.
The implications of our model for forecasting fundamentals and the behavior of s t f t are now clear. If dealers have imprecise information about fundamentals that follows a non-stationary process, the estimation errors f t E d t f t may be extremely persistent and the sample variance of f t E d t f t very large.
7 As a consequence, there may be a signi…cant degree of attenuation bias in the estimating s from the fundamentals forecasting projection (32). In terms of cointegration, while f t E d t f t is stationary; so that s t and f t are indeed cointegrated, realizations of f t E d t f t in any sample may appear non-stationary so that conventional tests reject cointegration between s t and f t : The failure to …nd cointegration stems not from using the wrong de…nition of fundamentals, f t : Rather, it results from the fact that dealers use E d t f t to set spot rates and the di¤erence between f t and E d t f t can be very persistent. Table 2 examines the time series properties of the expectational errors associated with di¤erent fundamental macro variables. The upper panel reports the results from the cointegrating regression of the real-time estimate of the fundamental variable on its own ex-post value, i.e., it addresses the expectational error f t E d t f t . (The reported standard errors are computed by Dynamic OLS in daily data with 10 leads and lags to correct for …nite-sample bias. Standard errors contain an MA(10) correction for residual serial correlation.) The p-values reported in parentheses are for the hypothesis that the cointegration coe¢ cient equals unity. Note that this is rejected in …ve of the six cases at the one-percent level, suggesting that elements of f t E d t f t contain a unit root. The lower panel reports daily autocorrelations for the real-time errors, de…ned as the di¤erence between the ex-post value and real-time estimate of the fundamental variables. These remain quite high, even at the one-quarter horizon, for many of the variables, which is consistent with the persistence argument above. We view these cointegration-test results as o¤ering promising prospects for resolving the puzzle of no-cointegration between exchange rates and fundamentals highlighted in past work.
Forecasting Fundamentals with Spot Rates and Order Flow
Our model shows that order ‡ow should have forecasting power for future spot rates when households' transaction ‡ows convey information about future fundamentals that is news to dealers. This interpretation of the order ‡ow/price change correlation implies that order ‡ow should have forecasting power for future fundamentals.
Proposition 5 When dealer quotes for the price of foreign currency satisfy (18), and order ‡ow follows (27), changes in future fundamentals are related to spot rates and order ‡ows by
where t+ is the projection error. s is the projection coe¢ cient identi…ed in (32) and x is equal to
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is straightforward. Recall from (31) that s t E d t f t is equal to the present value of future changes in fundamentals. The …rst term in (35) is therefore a function of dealers' information at the start of period t; d t : Period-t order ‡ow will have incremental forecasting power of future changes in fundamentals, beyond s t E d t f t ; when it conveys information about f t+h that is not already known to dealers (i.e. in d t ): The expression for x shows that this will happen when: (i) the distribution of wealth and dealer bond holdings a¤ect order ‡ow and have forecasting power for fundamentals, and (ii) when there is dispersed information concerning future fundamentals and the information aggregation accompanies period-t trading. Proposition 4 showed that order ‡ow would be correlated with the depreciation rate under these same conditions. Thus, if our theoretical rationale for the results in Table 1 holds true, we should also …nd that order ‡ow has incremental forecasting power for future changes in fundamentals.
Assessing the empirical evidence on this prediction is complicated by the fact that we don't have data on
Proposition 5 establishes the conditions under which order ‡ow has incremental forecasting power for fundamentals beyond the power in s t E d t f t . Does this mean that order ‡ow should also have incremental forecasting power relative to s t f t ? Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered theoretically. If the introduced measurement error of f t E d t f t is uncorrelated with order ‡ow, then attenuation bias will only a¤ect s . Under these circumstances, the forecasting power in s t E d t f t will be understated but order ‡ow will continue to have forecasting power via x : There is, however, no good reason why f t E d t f t and order ‡ow should be uncorrelated. In this case, the estimates of both s and x will be a¤ected by measurement error and it is conceivable that the estimate of x will be close to zero. Thus, as a theoretical matter, order ‡ow could appear not to have incremental forecasting power relative to s t f t ; even though it does relative to s t E d t f t : With this caveat in mind, we …rst conduct Granger Causality tests for a set of macro variables considered fundamental across a wide range of modeling traditions: GDP growth, M1 money growth, and CPI in ‡ation. 8 For consistency with earlier studies (for example, Engel and West 2004), we do not use the real-time estimates of these macro variables, but rather the ex-post values released by the US and German statistical agencies. For this reason, our Granger Causality tests involving GDP growth are based on a VAR estimated at the quarterly frequency, while the tests involving money growth and in ‡ation use VARs estimated in monthly data. All the VARs include one lag of the depreciation rate, the macro variable, a the six order ‡ow segments. Table presents marginal significance levels of tests whether end-user flows Granger cause three macro variables: output growth, money growth, and inflation. The tests are based on a monthly-frequency VAR for money and inflation, and a quarterly-frequency VAR for output growth. All the VARs include one lag of each of the following: the rate of exchangerate depreciation, the macro variable, and the 6 end-user flow segments.
The results in Table 3 show that order ‡ow forecasts all three of these variables at the one percent level. Interestingly, the spot rate itself is able to forecast only one of these three variables -GDP growth -at the one percent level. Moreover, we …nd no evidence of Granger causality going the opposite direction for either order ‡ow or the spot rate. In sum, the results in Table 3 provide an initial indication that there is fundamental information in the end-user order ‡ows.
To examine the forecasting power of order ‡ow in more detail, we next consider forecasting regressions of the form:
where h y j+h denotes the h period change in the macro variable y ending at t + h; k s t is the rate of depreciation between t k and t; and x k j;t is the order ‡ow from segment j in periods t k to t: We estimate this equation in weekly data using the real-time estimates of GDP, M1 and prices as the macro variables. Estimates from this regression allow us to address three questions: (i) what is the incremental forecasting power in order ‡ow? (ii) how does this forecasting power change with the forecasting horizon? and (iii) is order ‡ow able to forecast the measure of fundamentals relevant for exchange rate determination, dealers' real-time estimates? Table 4 presents the results from estimating (36) in weekly data with horizons h ranging from one month to two quarters. We report results where k is set equal to h; but our …ndings are not sensitive to the number of cumulation weeks k: There are a total of 284 weekly observations in our sample period, so there are 35 non-overlapping observations on the dependent variable at our longest forecasting horizon. In each cell of the table we report the R 2 statistic as a measure of forecasting power and the signi…cance level of a chi-squared test for the joint signi…cance of the forecasting variables. These test statistics are corrected for conditional heteroskedasticy and the moving-average error structure induced by the forecast overlap using the Newey-West estimator. The results in Table 4 clearly show that order ‡ow has considerable forecasting power for all of the six macro variables, and this forecasting power is typically a signi…cant increment over the forecasting power of the other variables considered. Consider, for example, the case of US GDP growth. At the two-quarter forecasting horizon, order ‡ow produces an R 2 statistic of 24.6 percent, which is signi…cant at the one-percent level. In contrast, forecasting US output growth two months out using both past US output growth and the spot rate produces an R 2 statistic of only 9.6 percent, a level of forecasting power that is insigni…cant at conventional levels. In general, the forecasting power of order ‡ow is greater as the forecasting horizon is lengthened. These results contrast quite sharply from the …ndings of Froot and Ramadorai (2002) . They found no evidence of a long run correlation between real interest rate di¤erentials (their measure of fundamentals) and the transaction ‡ows of institutional investors. One likely reason for this di¤erence is the wider span of end-users generating the order ‡ows in our data. As the coe¢ cient estimates in Table 1 indicate, transactions from di¤erent end-user segments appear to convey di¤erent information. Another likely reason concerns the way we measure macro fundamentals. Figure 1 showed that the real-time estimates of GDP display a good deal of high frequency volatility. This volatility represents the daily arrival of information and is characteristic of the other real-time estimates we use (i.e. in ‡ation and money growth). We have also seen from Table  2 that there is considerable persistence in the real-time estimation errors (i.e. the elements of
These observations indicate that forecasting changes in the elements of f t is a di¤erent proposition than forecasting the changes in E D t f t : However, it is the changes in E D t f t that are relevant for the expectations regarding future spot rates that drive order ‡ows. 
Estimating the Speed of Information Aggregation
The results in Table 4 support the idea that order ‡ow contains dispersed information about the future values of fundamental macro variables. While this …nding is consistent with theoretical mechanism driving exchange rate dynamics in our model, it does not tell us anything about the pace of information aggregation. Recall that it is the combination of dispersed information on the one hand, and the pace of information aggregation on the other, that produces the qualitatively new possibilities for exchange rate dynamics.
To quantify the pace at which the market aggregates macro information, we estimate the following regression:
where 13 y t+13 denotes the quarterly change in a given fundamental variable (i.e., 13 weeks), #w denotes the number of "learning weeks", and s t+i denotes the change in the spot exchange rate over week t + i. The idea here is that exchange rate changes should progressively impound more information about the fundamental y t . The …rst column of Table 5 presents the R 2 statistic from regression (37) for di¤erent numbers of learning
Given that exchange rate changes should progressively impound more fundamental information, one would expect the R 2 p to increase as the number of learning weeks is increased. This is in fact what we …nd for each of the six variables though the increase is often not signi…cant. The column labeled "Sig. I"reports p-values for the joint signi…cance of the coe¢ cients using a chi-squared test corrected for heteroskedasticity and the forecast overlap.
The incremental information in order ‡ow is expressed in columns three and four of each of Table 5 's panels. Column three presents the proportional increase in R 2 when order ‡ow is added to the regression.
That is, we estimate:
where x j;t is the quarterly order ‡ow from segment j. Column three then presents the statistic 5R If the information conveyed to dealers by order ‡ow concerning fundamentals is impounded in the exchange rate, the statistics in the third column should fall as the number of learning weeks increase. Moreover, if one expected this information to be fully re ‡ected in the exchange rate by, say, three weeks, then one would expect the column-three statistic to shrink to zero when the number of learning weeks is set to three. The most striking …nding displayed in Table 5 is that in every case these statistics do not shrink to zero, or even close to zero, even after 12 weeks. Yes, information in order ‡ow is getting impounded into exchange rates over time, but a lot of that information is still not impounded a quarter later. For example, a coe¢ cient in the third column, 12-week row, of 1.0 would imply that a quarter later, the exchange rate alone is impounding only half the fundamental information that order ‡ow and the exchange rate together convey. There should be no presumption that these statistics would shrink to zero if we considered longer horizons. The rate at which the macro variable is changing may match the pace of information aggregation in the market so that the statistics we see here could be quite representative of those derived from longer-horizon forecasts. Taken together, the results in Tables 4 and 5 provide strong evidence in support of the economic mechanisms that drive exchange rates in our model. In fact, our results sharply contradict the traditional assumption that little or no information dispersion exists. Instead, they point to the presence of dispersed, fundamental-related information in order ‡ow, and an information aggregation process that operates on a macroeconomic time scale, not in minutes, hours, or days.
One implication of these surprising …ndings is the order ‡ow should have forecasting power for spot rate changes. If the information aggregation process takes time, then order ‡ows should have forecasting power for future changes in spot rates over the corresponding learning period. To examine this possibility, Table 6 reports the results of estimating forecasting regressions for excess returns:
where i h t and i h t are respectively the h-period nominal interest rates on Euro and Dollar deposits. The regressions are estimated at the daily frequency with horizons h of one week to one month. Table 6 shows that many coe¢ cients in forecasting regression (38) are statistically signi…cant. This is particularly so for the coe¢ cients on US corporate and long-term investor order ‡ows. The results are also striking in terms of the degree of forecastability as measured by the R 2 statistics. Order ‡ows have more forecasting power as the horizon increases, reaching 19 percent at the one month horizon. This is a striking degree of forecastability. By comparison, the R 2 statistics from Fama-type regressions (where the rate of depreciation is regressed on the interest di¤erential) are generally in the 2-4 percent range. Of course the order ‡ows in our regressions represent the ‡ow of private information received by dealers in the market. So our forecasting results should not be interpreted as evidence that excess foreign currency returns can be easily forecast using data that was publicly available. Rather the degree of forecastability underlines the quantitative importance of the slow pace of information aggregation associated with exchange rate dynamics. Could the results in Table 6 stem from the restrictions we impose on the interest di¤erential in equation (38)? To address this question, we also estimated (38) with the addition of i h t i h t as a right hand side variable. This speci…cation e¤ectively relaxes the unit coe¢ cient restriction on the interest di¤erential in predicting the depreciation rate, a restriction that is overwhelming rejected by a vast empirical literature. The estimates from the amended regression are almost identical to those in Table 6 . In particular, the coe¢ cient on the interest di¤erential is small and statistically insigni…cant, while the coe¢ cients on order ‡ow and the R 2 statistics are essentially unchanged. These …ndings indicate that the results in Table 6 are indeed robust. They also show that in this data set there is no evidence of forward discount bias once we account for the e¤ects of order ‡ows on the rate of depreciation. χ statistics for the null that all the coefficients on order flow are zero. Estimates are calculated at the daily frequency using 1141 trading days in the sample. The standard errors correct for heteroskedastic and the moving average error process induced by overlapping forecasts.
Conclusion
This paper o¤ers a qualitatively di¤erent view of why macroeconomic variables perform so poorly in accounting for exchange rates at horizons of one year or less. This view is di¤erent from both the traditional macro view and the emerging "micro"view that associates exchange rate movements unexplained by macroeconomics as largely determined by order ‡ows. Our approach treats the unexplained term not simply as a disturbance, or projection error, but as an information phenomenon. Speci…cally, we address the possibility that transaction ‡ows in the foreign exchange market are conveying information about the present value of future fundamentals that is not captured in macro-econometric measures of fundamentals. If transaction ‡ows reaching the market are conveying signals of future macro realizations and these signals are truly incremental to the public information, then market-makers will impound this information in exchange rates. This mechanism produces "unexplained"exchange rate variation relative to observations on traditional macroeconomic variables.
Our approach di¤ers from the extant micro view in the literature because models o¤ered thus far (e.g., Evans and Lyons 2002a,b) have interpreted the information conveyed by transaction ‡ows as orthogonal to macro fundamentals. This information is viewed, instead, as relating to the other driver within the broader asset pricing literature; termed stochastic discount factors, expected returns or portfolio balance e¤ects. Most readers of this micro literature have adopted the same view: transaction ‡ow e¤ects on exchange rates are about pricing errors, not about fundamentals.
In this paper we developed a simple general equilibrium model of information aggregation that provides a utility-based present value representation for exchange rates. We then used the model to show that the presence of dispersed information about fundamentals and information aggregation lead to a concurrent correlation between changes in spot rates and transaction ‡ows that match the data. More strikingly, our model predicts that order ‡ow should have incremental forecasting power for future fundamentals relative to current spot rates. We also provide theoretical perspective on the apparent lack of cointegration between spot exchange rates and standard measures of fundamentals.
We presented four main empirical …ndings, all of which are consistent with our model: (i) order ‡ows forecast future macro variables such as output growth, money growth, and in ‡ation, (ii) order ‡ows generally forecast these macro variables better than spot rates do, (iii) order ‡ows forecast future spot rates, and (iv) though order ‡ows convey new information about future fundamentals, much of this information is still not impounded in the spot rate one quarter later. Together, these results have an important broad-level implication. Traditionally, people have viewed past micro-empirical …ndings linking transaction ‡ows and exchange rates as re ‡ecting a high-frequency, non-fundamental part of exchange rate determination. Our …ndings here suggest that the signi…cance of transaction ‡ows is deeper. Transaction ‡ows appear to be central to the process by which expectations of future macro variables are impounded into exchange rates. where = 1
(1 + (i)) ; =
(exp(i) 1) exp(i) (i) and k = ln + 1 1 ln + = : The sign of the coe¢ cient depends on the degree of curvature in the sub-utility function. To understand why, we need to consider the two channels through which nominal interest rates a¤ect the return on wealth via real balances. First, an increase in the interest rate lowers the excess return on wealth when real balances are a constant fraction of wealth. This can be seen from the de…nition of H m z;t+1 above. When < (>) 1; the former (latter) e¤ect dominates so the excess return on wealth is negatively (positively) related to the nominal interest rate. In the case of log utility ( = 1) the e¤ect exactly cancel, and = 0: Hereafter, we focus on the case where > 1, so that > 0 and excess returns are negatively related to the nominal interest rate. Using the de…nition of H z;t+1 above, we follow Campbell and Viceira (2002) in approximating the log excess return on wealth by: h t+1 = a z;t (r t+1 i t ) + b* z;t ( s t+1 + i t i t ) + 
where V h t (:) and CV h t (:; :) denote the variance and covariance conditioned on household z 0 s period t information, z;t : This second-order approximation holds exactly in the continuous-time limit when the spot exchange rate and the price of other assets follow Wiener processes.
We can now use (A1), (A2) and the linearized …rst order conditions to characterize the optimal choice of consumption, real balances and the portfolio shares a z;t and b* z;t : Combining the log linearized versions of (8c) and (8d) and E h t r t+1 i t r z;t are the risk-adjusted expected excess returns on foreign bonds and other assets. The variance terms arise because we are working with log excess returns. v z;t identi…es the consumption hedging factor associated with foreign bonds (v = s) and other assets (v = r):
All that now remains is to characterize the demand for real balances and the consumption wealth ratio. The former is found by log linearizing (8b): budget constraint for household z is: they receive from other dealers because interdealer trading is simultaneous. Rather period t orders must be conditioned on the orders of households, O for ! = fs; rg and d Following the same steps for European households, we obtain
